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Abstract
We consider a network pricing game on a parallel network with congestion effects in
which link owners set tolls for travel so as to maximize profit. A central authority is
able to regulate this competition by means of a (uniform) price cap. The first question
we want to answer is how such a cap should be designed in order to minimize the total
congestion. We provide an algorithm that finds an optimal price cap for networks with
affine latency functions and a full support Wardrop equilibrium. Second, we consider the
induced network performance at an optimal price cap. We show that for two link networks
with affine latency functions, the congestion costs at the optimal price cap are at most 8/7
times the optimal congestion costs. For more general latency functions, this bound goes up
to 2 under the assumption that an uncapped Nash equilibrium exists. However, in general
such an equilibrium need not exist and this can be used to show that optimal price caps
can induce arbitrarily inefficient flows.
Keywords: Game theory, competition regulation, toll caps, Nash equilibrium, Wardrop equi-
librium.
1 Introduction
With the ongoing privatization of public road infrastructure, toll charging on highways and
roads is common practice in many cities around the world (see e.g. Bergen [45], London [44],
Santiago de Chile [22], Singapore [42], and Stockholm [43]). The toll market in the United
States (starting already in the 18th century) is built on the key idea that private firms obtain
the right to construct the infrastructure (usually via an auction, see Porter and Zona [39])
and as compensation are allowed to charge tolls for road usage. Firms are further obligated
to reinvest parts of the revenues to maintain the infrastructure. To date about 35 States use
this mechanism and while it has worked well in some cases, several problems arose in the
past and still prevail. We report here one incident. In 2012, large toll rate increases have
been implemented by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (justified in part to
finance its World Trade Center project). In response, a bill was introduced in Congress that
would allow the Secretary of Transportation to regulate tolls on every bridge on the country’s
interstates and other federally aided highways.
If a regulation authority introduces toll caps, how should this cap be designed in order to
induce a socially beneficial outcome and how does this outcome perform? This question is at
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the core of our paper. We model the situation using a three-level optimization model, where in
the lowest (third) level, there are commuters that want to travel from an origin to a destination
and each commuter minimizes a combination of latency costs plus toll costs. We model the
route choice of a fixed volume of commuters using the concept of Wardrop equilibrium [47].
We further assume that the underlying network consists of n ≥ 2 parallel edges connecting
a common origin with a common destination. While this assumption is indeed restrictive, it
still models relevant situations, for instance, when there are parallel access roads (e.g. tollable
bridges) connecting the central district of a city with a suburb, and it is used in recent related
work (e.g. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1], and Wan [46]).
In the middle (second) layer, there are firms owning the edges and charging tolls on them.
Each firm maximizes revenue, but faces competition from other firms. We assume that each
firm owns only one edge. A Nash equilibrium is a vector of tolls, one toll value per firm, so that
no firm can improve by unilaterally deviating to another toll value. A Nash equilibrium takes
into account that commuters will (potentially) change their route choices once a firm deviates
to a different toll.1
The authority in the first and highest level can decide on some toll cap. We assume that
the authority is not allowed to discriminate between the different firms and puts one (uniform)
price cap applicable to all firms. We consider the situation in which the authority is purely
interested in minimizing the resulting total latency costs (clearly other objectives may be
feasible as well).
1.1 Our Results
We study a three-level optimization problem in which a central authority can impose a (uni-
form) price cap so as to minimize the total induced equilibrium congestion costs. We motivate
this form of competition regulation by showing that without any price regulation, the induced
equilibrium congestion costs can be arbitrarily higher than the optimal congestion costs be-
cause of too high prices of one of the firms.
For solving the three-level optimization problem, we first derive a set of structural results
for instances with affine latency functions. In particular, we show that a Nash equilibrium
exists for all price caps c, and is in fact unique whenever the Wardrop equilibrium has full
support. Moreover, under the full support assumption, we derive a complete characterization
of Nash equilibria using the KKT conditions of the underlying optimization problems of the
involved firms. Based on this characterization, we devise an algorithm that finds the optimal
price cap in polynomial time. The algorithm computes breakpoints at which the set of firms
putting their price equal to the cap changes. We show that these sets only increase (with
decreasing cap) so that there are at most n breakpoints, where n denotes the number of firms.
The breakpoints essentially divide the real line into at most n intervals and for each of these
intervals we show that the cost function is quadratic. Thus, the algorithm needs to solve at
most n quadratic one-dimensional minimization problems, which can be done in polynomial
time.
We then consider the performance of an optimal price cap. Given that a Nash equilibrium
always exists for networks with affine latency functions, we show a tight bound of 8/7 between
the congestion costs at an optimal price cap and the optimal congestion costs for duopoly
1In game theory this equilibrium concept is called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, but given that the
focus of this paper is on the pricing game, we will call it a Nash equilibrium.
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instances. For more general latency functions, this bound goes up to 2 if we assume that an
uncapped Nash equilibrium exists.
In general, however, the objective function of a firm in the second level is not concave,
the set of best replies is not convex and therefore standard techniques for proving existence of
a Nash equilibrium fail. In fact, we give an example in which an uncapped subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, we are able to use the nonexistence of uncapped
Nash equilibria to construct a sequence of instances in which the ratio between the congestion
costs at the optimal price cap and the optimal congestion costs goes to infinity.
1.2 Related Work
The inefficiency of selfish behavior in congestion games has been well recognized since the
work of Pigou [38] in economics and Wardrop [47] in transportation networks. A natural way
to quantify this inefficiency is the price of anarchy as defined by Koutsoupias and Papdim-
itrou [33]. For routing games this is first done by Roughgarden and Tardos [41] and later by
Correa et al. [15].
One way to restore efficiency is by means of centralized pricing. Beckmann et al. [4] and
Dafermos and Sparrow [16] showed that marginal cost pricing induces an equilibrium flow
that is optimal. Despite the effectiveness of marginal cost tolls, there are two drawbacks.
First, potentially each edge in the network is tolled; an issue that is considered by Hoefer et
al. [27] and Harks et al. [24]. Second, the imposed tolls can be arbitrary large; an issue that is
considered by Bonifaci et al. [6], Fotakis et al. [21], Jelinek et al. [28] and Kleer and Scha¨fer [32].
Cole et al. [12] show that optimal tolls also exist when users are heterogeneous with respect to
the tradeoff between time and money. Later this result was extended to general networks by
Fleischer et al. [20], Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [31] and Yang and Huang [49].
Instead of improving efficiency, tolls can also be used to minimize or maximize the profit
of one or multiple leaders. The model that computes tolls that induce the optimal flow at
minimal profit was analyzed by Dial [18, 19]. The model with one profit maximizing leader
and no congestion effects, was first analyzed by Labbe´ et al. [34] and later by Briest et al. [7].
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1] introduced a model of price competition between link owners in
a parallel network that is very similar to ours. The main difference is that in their model users
have a reservation value for travel. This implies that if links become too expensive users choose
not to travel, whereas in our model users always travel through the network. Their main result
is a (tight) bound on the inefficiency of equilibria. Later several generalizations of the model
were introduced. The follow-up work of Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2] allows for a slightly more
general topology, namely parallel paths with multiple links, and show that equilibria can be
arbitrarily inefficient. Hayrapetyan et al. [26] consider the model with elastic traffic demand.
Their bounds on inefficiency, however, are not tight, which is improved upon by Ozdaglar [36].
Recently, following our question on competition regulation of price competition between
edge owners, Correa et al. [14] considered the setting in which a central authority is allowed
to put different toll caps on different edges of the network. Their main result is that for all
network topologies there are toll caps so that firms are willing to put their toll equal to the cap,
and the induced equilibrium flow is the optimal flow. An example of such caps are marginal
tolls as introduced by Beckmann et al. [4]. Notice that the assumption of individual toll caps is
important. In practice, however, toll cap discrimination is often not allowed, which motivates
our work on uniform toll caps.
A different extension was proposed by Johari et al. [29]. They extend the analysis of price
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competition by including investment and entry decisions. The model of Xiao et al. [48] studies
competition in both tolls and capacities and finds that tolls are higher, but capacities are lower
than socially desired. Other recent models of Bertrand competition in a network setting that
use different ways of modelling congestion effects are Anshelevich and Sekar [3], Chawla and
Niu [10], Chawla and Roughgarden [11], Papadimitriou and Valiant [37] and Caragiannis et
al. [8].
2 The model
An instance of the three-level optimization problem is given by the tuple I = (N, (ℓi)i∈N ),
where N = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2, is a set of parallel links connecting a common source
with a common destination. There is one unit of flow to be sent over the links. Let xi ∈ R+
be the total flow on link i and x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the vector of flows. Each link has a
flow-dependent latency function ℓi(xi) that we assume to be strictly increasing, convex and
continuously differentiable. We denote this class of functions by Lc. By Ld we denote the class
of strictly increasing polynomial latency functions with nonnegative coefficients and degree at
most d. In particular, L1 denotes the class of strictly increasing affine latency functions.
Given a flow x, define the total latency costs by
C(x) =
∑
i∈N
ℓi(xi) · xi.
A flow x∗ is optimal, if C(x∗) ≤ C(x) for all flows x.
Let ti ∈ R+ be the toll on link i and t = (t1, . . . , tn) be the vector of tolls. The effective
cost of a user of link i is ℓi(xi) + ti. Given a toll vector t, a flow x is a Wardrop equilibrium
for t, if for all i, j ∈ N with xi > 0,
ℓi(xi) + ti ≤ ℓj(xj) + tj .
In particular, if x is an equilibrium for t, then all links with positive flow have equal effective
costs, i.e., there is some K > 0 with ℓi(xi) + ti = K for all i ∈ N with xi > 0. It is well-known
that given our assumptions on the latency functions, an equilibrium for t exists, is unique and
can be described by means of the following inequality (see Beckmann et al. [4] and Dafermos
and Sparrow [16]).
Lemma 2.1. A flow x is a Wardrop equilibrium for t if and only if for all feasible flows x′,∑
i∈N
(ℓi(xi) + ti) · (xi − x′i) ≤ 0.
For each toll vector t, we denote by x(t) the unique equilibrium for t. The equilibrium for
t = 0 is called the Wardrop equilibrium.
2.1 Nash Equilibrium
We assume that each link i ∈ N is owned by a firm (also denoted by i) and that the objective
of each firm is to maximize profit. Given a toll vector t ∈ RN+ , define Πi(ti, t−i) = ti · xi(t) for
all i ∈ N . A toll vector t is a c-capped Nash equilibrium, if for all i ∈ N , t ≤ c and for all
0 ≤ t′i ≤ c,
Πi(ti, t−i) ≥ Πi(t′i, t−i).
4
Observe that the flow adapts to the toll vector (t′i, t−i) in the calculation of Πi(t
′
i, t−i). Given
t−i ∈ RN\{i}+ and c ∈ R+, defineBci (t−i) = argmax
0≤ti≤c
Πi(ti, t−i) andB
∞
i (t−i) = argmax
ti≥0
Πi(ti, t−i)
for all i ∈ N .
Given c ∈ R+, we denote by
T (c) = {t ∈ Rn+ | t is a c-capped Nash equilibrium}
the set of c-capped Nash equilibria. By T (∞) we denote the set of uncapped Nash equilibria.
Note that there might be instances for which T (c) is not a singleton for some c ∈ R+, and for
which T (c) = ∅ for some c ∈ R+.
2.2 Designing Price Caps
The following example provides the motivation for our research: in terms of latency costs, a
Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal flow.
Example 2.1. Consider the network of Figure 1.
s t
ℓ1(x1) = x1
ℓ2(x2) = a2 · x2
Figure 1: An inefficient Nash equilibrium as a2 →∞.
Then
B∞1 (t2) =
{
a2+t2
2 , if t2 ≤ a2 + 2,
t2 − 1, if t2 > a2 + 2,
and
B∞2 (t1) =
{
1+t1
2 , if t1 ≤ 2a2 + 1,
t1 − a2, if t1 > 2a2 + 1.
Combining B∞1 (t2) and B
∞
2 (t1), if t ∈ T (∞), then t =
(
2a2+1
3 ,
a2+2
3
)
. Since x(t) =
(
2a2+1
3a2+3
, a2+23a2+3
)
and x∗ =
(
a2
a2+1
, 1a2+1
)
, we have C(x(t)) =
a22+7a2+1
9a2+9
and C(x∗) = a2a2+1 . Hence
C(x(t))
C(x∗) =
a22+7a2+1
9a2
→∞ as a2 →∞. As a2 →∞, the price of firm 1 grows faster than the price of firm
2, which pushes too much flow onto link 2, creating inefficiencies.
The bad performance of the Nash equilibrium calls for competition regulation. The regu-
lation policy we focus on is that of a price cap c ∈ R+: no firm is allowed to set its toll above
the price cap, i.e., ti ≤ c for all i ∈ N .
Formally, we seek to choose c so as to solve the following three-level optimization problem:
inf
c∈R+
sup
t∈T (c)
C(x(t)). (3L-P)
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If T (c) = ∅ for some c ∈ R+, we assume that C(x(t)) =∞. Observe that T (0) 6= ∅.
Note that this is a quite appealing and robust formulation: we minimize total costs for
the worst possible realization of a Nash equilibrium. It is known, however, that multi-level
optimization problems are notoriously hard in terms of proving existence and computability
of optimal solution.
In the next section, we derive structural results of Nash equilibria and their corresponding
Wardrop equilibria. These structural results contain existence and uniqueness of equilibria for
networks with affine latencies and a comparative statics result with respect to different price
caps. These insights form the basis of our polynomial time algorithm computing an optimal
price cap for the case of affine latency functions.
3 Structural Properties of Nash Equilibria
Assume that ℓi(xi) = ai · xi + bi with ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0. The first result shows that for affine
latency functions, a Nash equilibrium exists for all price caps. A similar result is obtained for
the model in which users have a reservation value for travel and there are no price caps by
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1] and Hayrapetyan et al. [26].
Proposition 3.1. Let ℓi ∈ L1 for all i ∈ N . Then, there exists a c-capped Nash equilibrium
for all c ∈ R+.
Proof. Assume that ℓi(xi) = ai · xi + bi with ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0. For all toll vectors t ∈ RN+ ,
define N(t) = {i ∈ N | xi(t) > 0}.
Since x(t) is an equilibrium for t, we have ai · xi(t) + bi + ti = K for all i ∈ N(t). With∑
i∈N(t) xi(t) = 1, we get K =
1+
∑
j∈N(t)
bj+tj
aj∑
j∈N(t)
1
aj
and thus
xi(t) =
1 +
∑
j∈N(t)
bj+tj−bi−ti
aj∑
j∈N(t)
ai
aj
for all i ∈ N(t). (1)
By the Theorem of the Maximum [5], it follows that Bc(t) = (Bci (t−i))i∈N is upper semi-
continuous and hence has a closed graph. We show that Bci (t−i) is a convex set for all t−i.
Assume t−i ∈ RN\{i}+ and consider the following two cases: (a) Πi(ti, t−i) = 0 for all ti ∈ R+
and (b) Πi(ti, t−i) > 0 for some ti ∈ R+.
Case (a): Suppose Πi(ti, t−i) = 0 for all ti ∈ R+. Obviously Bci (t−i) is convex.
Case (b): Suppose there is some t′i ∈ R+ with Πi(t′i, t−i) > 0. We will prove that Πi(ti, t−i)
is a concave function in ti until there is some t¯i such that Πi(ti, t−i) = 0 for all ti ≥ t¯i. Observe
the following from (1).
(i) If j ∈ N(t′i, t−i), with j 6= i, for some t′i ∈ R+, then j ∈ N(ti, t−i) for all ti ≥ t′i. That is,
the set N(t) increases as ti increases.
(ii) For a fixed N(t), Πi(ti, t−i) is either linear or quadratic in ti. Πi(t) is linear if and only
if N(t) = {i}, which can only happen for ti ∈ [0, tˆi] for some tˆi ∈ R+. In all other cases,
Πi(t) is quadratic with a decreasing slope.
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Now in order to prove that Πi(ti, t−i) is a concave function in ti, it is sufficient to show that
the slope decreases at every toll ti for which new links start to receive flow, i.e. a new set of
players joins N(ti, t−i). To this end, let ti denote a price at which a new set of firms starts to
receive flow and let us denote this set by N¯ . Notice that
∂−Πi(ti, t−i)
∂ti
=
1 +
∑
j∈N(t):j 6=i
bj+tj−bi−2ti
aj∑
j∈N(t)
ai
aj
∂+Πi(ti, t−i)
∂ti
=
1 +
∑
j∈N(t)∪N¯ :j 6=i
bj+tj−bi−2ti
aj∑
j∈N(t)∪N¯
ai
aj
where ∂−Πi(ti,t−i)∂ti and
∂+Πi(ti,t−i)
∂ti
denote the left and right partial derivative with respect to ti,
respectively. So in order to prove that the slope decreases it is sufficient to show that
1 + ∑
j∈N(t):j 6=i
bj + tj − bi − 2ti
aj

 ·∑
k∈N¯
ai
ak
≥
∑
k∈N¯
bk + tk − bi − 2ti
ak
·
∑
j∈N(t)
ai
aj
. (2)
We get
∑
k∈N¯
bk + tk − bi − 2ti
ak
·
∑
j∈N(t)
ai
aj
=
∑
k∈N¯
ai · xi(t)− ti
ak
·
∑
j∈N(t)
ai
aj
=
∑
k∈N¯
1 +
∑
j∈N(t):j 6=i
bj+tj−bi−ti
aj
− ∑
j∈N(t)
ti
aj
ak ·
∑
j∈N(t)
1
aj
·
∑
j∈N(t)
ai
aj
=
∑
k∈N¯

1 + ∑
j∈N(t):j 6=i
bj + tj − bi − 2ti
aj

 · ai
ak
− ti
ak
=

1 + ∑
j∈N(t):j 6=i
bj + tj − bi − 2ti
aj
− ti
ai

 ·∑
k∈N¯
ai
ak
,
where the first equality follows from bk + tk = ai · xi(t) + bi + ti for all k ∈ N¯ , the second
equality from the definition of xi(t), and the last two inequalities from rewriting. Since
ti
ai
> 0,
(2) holds true. Hence Bci (t−i) is convex-valued.
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [30] now implies that there exists an equilibrium for all
price caps c ∈ R+.
The following lemma states a very natural comparative statics result, showing that a uni-
lateral increase in toll by one firm only decreases the flow on the corresponding link while the
flow on other links only increases.
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Lemma 3.1. Let i ∈ N and t = (ti, t−i), t′ = (t′i, t−i) ∈ Rn+ with ti ≤ t′i. Then xi(t) ≥ xi(t′)
and xj(t) ≤ xj(t′) for all j 6= i.
Proof. It is well known (see Beckmann et al. [4] and Dafermos and Sparrow [16]) that x is an
equilibrium for t if x solves the following minimization problem
min
x
∑
i∈N
∫ xi
0
(ℓi(y) + ti) dy.
Hence
∑
i∈N
∫ xi(t)
0
(ℓi(y) + ti) dy ≤
∑
i∈N
∫ xi(t′)
0
(ℓi(y) + ti) dy
∑
i∈N
∫ xi(t′)
0
(ℓi(y) + t
′
i) dy ≤
∑
i∈N
∫ xi(t)
0
(ℓi(y) + t
′
i) dy
Combining these inequalities we get∑
j∈N
(tj − t′j) · (xj(t)− xj(t′)) ≤ 0. (3)
Using t′ = (t′i, t−i), we get
(ti − t′i) · (xi(t)− xi(t′)) ≤ 0,
and thus xi(t) ≥ xi(t′).
Before we prove that xj(t) ≤ xj(t′) for all j 6= i, we first show that ℓi(xi(t)) + ti ≤
ℓi(xi(t
′)) + t′i. Since x(t) + (x(t
′) − x(t)) = x(t′) is a feasible flow, x(t′) − x(t) is a feasible
direction for x(t). By the first-order optimality conditions,∑
i∈N
(ℓi(xi(t)) + ti) · (xi(t)− xi(t′)) ≤ 0.
Analogously, x(t)− x(t′) is a feasible direction for x(t′), and thus∑
i∈N
(ℓi(xi(t
′)) + t′i) · (xi(t′)− xi(t)) ≤ 0.
Adding up these inequalities, we obtain∑
j 6=i
(xj(t)− xj(t′)) · (ℓj(xj(t)) − ℓj(xj(t′)))
+ (xi(t)− xi(t′)) · (ℓi(xi(t)) + ti − ℓi(xi(t′))− t′i) ≤ 0.
Notice that the first summation term is nonnegative, as ℓi is increasing for all i ∈ N . Thus,
ℓi(xi(t)) + ti ≤ ℓi(xi(t′)) + t′i. (4)
Now we prove that xj(t) ≤ xj(t′) for all j 6= i. Notice that we can assume that xi(t) > 0,
as otherwise the conclusion follows trivially. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that
xj(t) > xj(t
′) for some j 6= i. Then
ℓj(xj(t
′)) + tj < ℓj(xj(t)) + tj ≤ ℓi(xi(t)) + ti ≤ ℓi(xi(t′)) + t′i ≤ ℓj(xj(t′)) + tj,
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where the first inequality follows from xj(t) > xj(t
′), the second inequality from xj(t) > 0, the
third inequality from (4), and the fourth inequality from xi(t
′) > 0. This is a contradiction
and finishes the proof.
From now on, we assume that xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N . In terms of practical applications,
this assumption seems not overly restrictive since a road segment is usually only priced if there
is traffic without any tolls. However, the assumption is important for proving uniqueness of
Nash equilibria. Example 4.2 shows that multiple Nash equilibria may exist in case the full
Wardrop support assumption is not satisfied.
The full support assumption xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N does not imply a priori that any Nash
equilibrium xi(t), i ∈ N for some t ∈ T (c), c ∈ R+ also has the full support property. In the
following, however, we show that given the full support property for t = 0, it continues to hold
for all t ∈ T (c), c ∈ R+.
Lemma 3.2. Let c > 0 and t ∈ T (c). If xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N , then xi(t) > 0 and ti > 0 for
all i ∈ N .
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, if xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N , then xi(0, t−i) > 0 for all i ∈ N and all t−i.
As the profit function is continuous in the toll vector (Hayrapetyan et al. [26]), this implies
that for all t−i, there is some ti so that Πi(ti, t−i) > 0. Hence if t ∈ T (c), then for all i ∈ N ,
Πi(ti, t−i) > 0 and thus xi(t) > 0 and ti > 0.
In the following lemma we derive an explicit price representation of Nash equilibria.
Lemma 3.3. Let c ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} and t ∈ T (c). If xi(t) > 0 for all i ∈ N , then for all i ∈ N ,
ti = min



ℓ′i(xi(t)) + 1∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj(t))

 · xi(t), c

 .
Proof. Assume that xi(t) > 0 for all i ∈ N . Given t−i ∈ RN\{i}+ , each firm i ∈ N solves the
following maximization problem:
max ti · xi
s.t. ℓj(xj) + tj = K for all j ∈ N,∑
j∈N
xj = 1,
ti ≤ c.
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L(ti, x,K, λ, µ, ν)
= ti · xi −
∑
j∈N
λj · (ℓj(xj) + tj −K)− ν · (
∑
j∈N
xj − 1)− µ · (ti − c).
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So the Kuhn-Tucker conditions reduce to
∂L(ti, x,K, λ, µ, ν)
∂ti
= xi − λi − µ = 0, (5)
∂L(ti, x,K, λ, µ, ν)
∂xi
= ti − λi · ℓ′i(xi)− ν = 0, (6)
∂L(ti, x,K, λ, µ, ν)
∂xj
= −λj · ℓ′j(xj)− ν = 0, (7)
∂L(ti, x,K, λ, µ, ν)
∂K
=
∑
j∈N
λj = 0. (8)
By (5),
λi = xi − µ. (9)
By (6) and plugging in (9),
ti = ℓ
′
i(xi) · λi + ν = ℓ′i(xi) · (xi − µ) + ν. (10)
By (7), for all j 6= i,
λj = −ν · 1
ℓ′j(xj)
. (11)
By (11),
∑
j 6=i
λj = −ν ·
∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj)
(12)
By (8), (9) and (12),
ν =
λi −
∑
j∈N λj∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj)
=
λi∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj)
=
xi − µ∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj)
. (13)
Combining (10) and (13) yields
ti =

ℓ′i(xi) + 1∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj)

 · (xi − µ).
If ti < c, then we know µ = 0, and thus,
ti =

ℓ′i(xi) + 1∑
j 6=i
1
ℓ′j(xj)

 · xi.
Now we derive a complete characterization of equilibria.
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Theorem 3.1. Let xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N and let c ∈ R+. The tuple (t, x) is a c-capped Nash
equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold for some K > 0:
aixi + bi + ti = K for all i ∈ N, (14)∑
i∈N
xi = 1, (15)
ti = min
{(
ai +
1∑
j 6=i
1
aj
)
· xi, c
}
for all i ∈ N, (16)
xi > 0 for all i ∈ N. (17)
Proof. We first show ⇒: Conditions (14) and (17) follow from Lemma 3.2 and the Wardrop
condition. Condition (15) is trivial. Condition (16) follows from Lemma 3.3.
Now we prove ⇐: let (t′, x′) be a tuple that satisfies (14)-(17). We want to show that
(t′, x′) = (t, x), where (t, x) is a Nash equilibrium, which by Proposition 3.1 exists. By (16), we
get that tolls t′ are feasible w.r.t. c. Condition (14) implies that x′ is a Wardrop equilibrium
with full support with respect to t′. Hence, similarly as in (3), we get∑
j∈N
(tj − t′j) · (xj − x′j) ≤ 0. (18)
Assume by contradiction that there is i ∈ N with t′i < ti (the case t′i > ti follows similarly).
By (16), we get
t′i =
(
ai +
1∑
j 6=i
1
aj
)
· x′i < ti ≤
(
ai +
1∑
j 6=i
1
aj
)
· xi.
From this x′i < xi follows. Putting things together, we get∑
j∈N
(tj − t′j)(xj − x′j) > 0
a contradiction to (18).
Corollary 3.1. There is at most one tuple (t, x) that satisfies (14)-(17), thus the Nash equi-
librium is unique.
If T (c) is singular, we let t(c) denote t ∈ T (c), and x(c) denote x(t(c)).
4 Optimal price caps for affine latencies
Assume that ℓi(xi) = ai · xi + bi with ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0, and xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N . Now we
have everything together to derive an optimal polynomial time algorithm for networks with
affine latencies, which is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1. Let ℓi ∈ L1 and xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N . Algorithm 1 computes in polynomial
time an optimal price cap.
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Algorithm 1: An optimal algorithm for affine latencies.
input : I = (N, (ℓi)i∈N )
output: An optimal price cap c∗
1 initialize
2 c0 ←∞;
3 A(c0)← ∅;
4 j ← 0;
5 while A(cj) 6= N do
6 K(c)←
1+
∑
k∈A(cj)
bk+c
ak
+
∑
k∈N\A(cj )
bk
2ak+
1∑
l∈N\{k}
1/al
∑
k∈A(cj)
1
ak
+
∑
k∈N\A(cj)
1
2ak+
1∑
l∈N\{k}
1/al
;
7 xi(c)← K(c)−bi−cai for all i ∈ A(cj);
8 xi(c)← K(c)−bi2ai+ 1∑
j 6=i 1/aj
for all i ∈ N \A(cj);
9 ti(c)← c for all i ∈ A(cj);
10 ti(c)←
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) for all i ∈ N \A(cj);
11 cij+1 ← max
{
c
∣∣∣(ai + 1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) = c
}
for all i ∈ N \A(cj);
12 cj+1 ← max
{
cij+1
∣∣∣i ∈ N \ A(cj)} ;
13 A(cj+1)← A(cj) ∪ argmax
{
cij+1 | i ∈ N \ A(cj)
}
;
14 j ← j + 1;
15 c∗j ← argminc∈[cj ,cj−1]
∑
i∈N ℓi(xi(c)) · xi(c)
16 end
17 output c∗ ∈ argmin {C(x(c∗k)), k = 1, . . . , j}
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Proof. We show by induction on the iterations of the while loop of Algorithm 1 (indexed by
k ∈ N) that the algorithm computes breakpoints c1 > · · · > ck > · · · > cj so that in the
intervals I1 = [c1,∞) and Ik = [ck, ck−1] for k = 2, . . . , j + 1 with cj+1 = 0 the following
invariant holds: for all k = 1, . . . , j + 1, the flows xi(c), i ∈ N as defined in Lines 7 and 8
together with prices ti(c), i ∈ N as defined in Lines 9 and 10 constitute the unique Nash
equilibrium for all c ∈ Ik.
Consider the base case k = 1. First, observe that Line 12 is well defined since the maximum
in Line 12 obviously exists (it is attained at c1 = maxi∈N ti(∞)). The parameterized flow x(c)
as defined in lines Line 7 and 8 is a solution of the following system of linear equations:
ai · xi(c) + bi +
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) = K(c) for all i ∈ N,
∑
i∈N
xi(c) = 1.
By Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1, x(c), t(c) is the unique Nash equilibrium for all c ∈ I1.
For the inductive step k → k + 1, assume x(c), t(c) as defined in Lines 7-10 is the unique
Nash equilibrium for all c ∈ Iℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , k.
First, we show again that the maximum cik+1, i ∈ N \A(ck) in Line 11 exists so that Lines 11
and 12 are well defined, and, that ck+1 = max{cik+1|i ∈ N \ A(ck)} < ck as claimed. To see
this, observe that for i ∈ N \A(ck), we have
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(ck) < ck. On the other hand,
by the assumption that xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N we have
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(0) > 0. As the
function
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) is continuous in c, by the intermediate value theorem, there
exists c¯ik+1 with (
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c¯ik+1) = c¯ik+1,
implying cik+1 < ck and thus ck+1 < ck.
We next prove that x(c), t(c) as defined in Lines 7-10 is the unique Nash equilibrium for
all c ∈ Ik+1. We prove this by showing that x(c), t(c) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1.
Observe that x(c) is a solution of the following system of linear equations:
ai · xi(c) + bi + ti = K(c) for all i ∈ N,
ti = c for all i ∈ A(ck),
ti =
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) for all i ∈ N \ A(ck),
∑
i∈N
xi(c) = 1.
By Theorem 3.1, it is suffices to show that ti(c) satisfies condition (16) for all i ∈ N, c ∈ Ik+1.
From Lines 11 and 12 we get ti(c) ≤ c for all i ∈ N \ A(ck) and all c ∈ Ik+1. It remains to
show that for all i ∈ A(ck) and all c ∈ Ik+1,(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) ≥ c.
13
We know by the induction hypothesis that x(ck) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and thus
satisfies
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(ck) ≥ ck for all i ∈ A(ck). For all c ∈ (ck+1, ck), we have
∂K(c)
∂c
=
∑
i∈A(cj)
1
ai∑
i∈A(cj)
1
ai
+
∑
i∈N\A(cj)
1
2ai+
1∑
l∈N\{i}
1/al
≤ 1,
and thus by Line 7, we get for all i ∈ A(ck) and all c ∈ (ck+1, ck),
∂xi(c)
∂c
≤ 0.
So when decreasing c from ck to ck+1, it follows that
(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
·xi(c) increases, and thus(
ai +
1∑
l 6=i 1/al
)
· xi(c) ≥ c for all i ∈ A(ck) and all c ∈ Ik+1, which completes the induction
proof.
For each Ik, with k = 1, . . . , j + 1, the objective function
C(x(c)) =
∑
i∈N
ℓi(xi(c)) · xi(c)
is quadratic in c, thus, we can find a local minimum by comparing the two endpoints and
a possible interior minimum point. For the interior minimum, we just need to check first-
order optimality conditions, thus, solving a linear equation in c. This way, we have effectively
partitioned the search space R+ into at most n intervals. As we solved each segment optimally,
taking the best solution leads to the optimal c∗.
Remark 4.1. The algorithm is still polynomial for arbitrary demands d ≥ 0 since solving
the linear equation systems appearing in the algorithm can be done in polynomial time in the
encoding length of d.
The following example demonstrates the calculation process of the algorithm.
Example 4.1. Consider the network of Figure 2.
s t
ℓ1(x1) = x1
ℓ2(x2) = x2 +
1
2
Figure 2: A demonstration of the algorithm.
By Lemma 3.3, the uncapped Nash equilibrium prices can be found by solving the following
system of linear equations
x1(c) + 2x1(c) = K(c),
x2(c) +
1
2
+ 2x2(c) = K(c),
x1(c) + x2(c) = 1,
14
and thus are given by t(∞) = (76 , 56). Initialize c1 = 76 and A(c1) = {1}. Solve the following
system of linear equations
x1(c) + c = K(c),
x2(c) +
1
2
+ 2x2(c) = K(c),
x1(c) + x2(c) = 1,
yields x2(c) =
2c+1
8 . Solving 2 · 2c+18 = c yields c = 12 . Hence, c2 = 12 and A(c2) = {1, 2}.
Therefore,
C(x(c)) =


3
4 , if c ≤ 12 ,
4c2−9c+27
32 , if
1
2 < c ≤ 76 ,
13
18 , if c >
171
224 ,
which is minimized for c = 1. Notice that we induce the optimal flow with a uniform price cap
of c = 1.
The last example of this section shows that the full Wardrop support assumption is impor-
tant. Without this assumption, a Nash equilibrium need not be unique.
Example 4.2. Consider the network of Figure 3. Assume that t3 = 0. Then
s t
ℓ1(x1) = x1
ℓ2(x2) = x2
ℓ3(x3) =
x3
2 +
6
5
Figure 3: Multiple Nash equilibria.
B∞1 (t2, t3) =


t1 =
t2+1
2 , if 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 35 ,
t1 =
7−5t2
5 , if
3
5 < t2 ≤ 57 ,
t1 =
5t2+17
30 , if
5
7 < t2 ≤ 1710 ,
t1 =
17
20 , if t2 >
17
10 .
and
B∞2 (t1, t3) =


t2 =
t1+1
2 , if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 35 ,
t2 =
7−5t1
5 , if
3
5 < t1 ≤ 57 ,
t2 =
5t1+17
30 , if
5
7 < t1 ≤ 1710 ,
t2 =
17
20 , if t1 >
17
10 .
Combining B∞1 (t2, t3) and B
∞
2 (t1, t3) (see Figure 4) implies that the set{(
t1,
7
5 − t1, 0
) | 2435 ≤ t1 ≤ 57} are Nash equilibria.
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0 1
2 1
1
2
1
t1
t2
Figure 4: Best reply correspondence: in blue for player 1, and in (dashed) red for player 2.
Remark 4.2. The network pricing game of Example 4.2 exhibits another interesting phe-
nomenon: if ℓ3(x3) = a3 · x3 + 65 with a3 ≤ 2/3, then every equilibrium yields a profit of 0 for
firm 3, whereas if ℓ3(x3) = a3 · x3 + 65 with a3 > 2/3, then the equilibrium is unique and yields
a strictly positive profit for firm 3. This implies that firm 3 is worse off by being congestion
free than by being sufficiently congestion dependent. The reason is that in the former case firm
3 is too competitive, and thus its two competitors set prices in such a way that prevents the
third firm from entering the market.
5 Optimal price caps for duopolies
In this section, we compare the latency costs of optimal price caps with those of optimal
solutions minimizing total congestion (ignoring price competition). The aim of this comparison
is to reveal the possible strength of introducing price caps as a mechanism. Our results,
however, only hold for duopolies, that is, we assume n = 2 for the following analysis. We
conjecture though that our results carry over to general n (in the spirit of Pigou instances).
Let c∗ denote an optimal price cap (a solution to problem 3L-P), let x∗ denote the optimal
flow (ignoring price caps), and let L ⊆ Lc be a class of latency functions. We are interested in
the ratio ρ(L) between the latency costs at the optimal price cap and the latency costs of the
optimal flow, defined by, for all ℓ ∈ L,
C(x(c∗)) ≤ ρ(L) · C(x∗).
Our main results are as follows.
Theorem 5.1. Let n = 2 and T (c) 6= ∅ for all c ∈ R+. Then
(i) ρ(Ld) ≤ (1− d2(d+1)(d+1)/d )−1,
(ii) ρ(Lc) ≤ 2.
Suppose that we have a Nash equilibrium in which one firm receives all the flow, say firm
1. The proof of Lemma 3.3 implies that in that case ℓ1(1) + ℓ
′
1(1) ≤ ℓ2(0). This again implies
that the duopoly and optimal flow coincide. So in the remainder of this section, we assume
that xi(t) > 0 for all i = 1, 2 for t ∈ T (∞).
Before we prove the main result of this section, we introduce some helpful lemmas.
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Lemma 5.1. Let t ∈ T (∞). Suppose that xi(t) > 0 for i = 1, 2. Then x1(0) ≥ x1(t) if and
only if x1(t) ≥ 12 .
Proof. Suppose that x1(0) ≥ x1(t). Then
ℓ1(x1(t)) ≤ ℓ1(x1(0)) ≤ ℓ2(x2(0)) ≤ ℓ2(x2(t)),
where the first inequality follows from x1(t) ≤ x1(0) and ℓ1 increasing, the second inequality
from x1(0) ≥ x1(t) > 0, and the third inequality from x2(0) ≤ x2(t) and ℓ2 increasing. Since
xi(t) > 0 for i = 1, 2, we have that ℓ1(x1(t)) + t1 = ℓ2(x2(t)) + t2 and thus t1 ≥ t2. Hence
Lemma 3.3 implies that x1(t) ≥ x2(t) and thus x1(0) ≥ x1(t) ≥ 12 .
Suppose that x1(0) < x1(t). Then
ℓ2(x2(t)) < ℓ2(x2(0)) ≤ ℓ1(x1(0)) < ℓ1(x1(t)),
where the first inequality follows from x2(t) < x2(0) and ℓ2 increasing, the second inequality
from x2(0) > 0, and the third inequality from x1(0) < x1(t) and ℓ1 increasing. Since xi(t) > 0
for i = 1, 2, we have that ℓ1(x1(t)) + t1 = ℓ2(x2(t)) + t2 and thus t1 < t2. Hence Lemma 3.3
implies that x1(t) < x2(t) and thus x1(t) <
1
2 .
Define
µ1(ℓi) = sup
xi,x∗i≥0
(ℓi(xi)− ℓi(x∗i )) · x∗i
ℓi(xi) · xi
for each ℓi ∈ L and
µ1(L) = sup
ℓi∈L
µ1(ℓi).
The parameter µ1(L) is a measure of the steepness of the class of allowable latency functions
that is well studied in the context of bounding the price of anarchy in routing games. It is well
known that the price of anarchy in routing games can be bounded as a function of the class
of allowable latency functions, but usually not in terms of other characteristics of the instance
like the topology of the network. For more details, see, for example, Correa et al. [15] and
Roughgarden [40]. Observe that µ1(L) ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 5.2. If xi(0) > x
∗
i and xi(0) ≤ 12 for some i = 1, 2, then C(x(0)) ≤ 11−µ1(L)/2 ·C(x∗).
Proof. W.l.o.g. suppose that x1(0) > x
∗
1 and x1(0) ≤ 12 . By Lemma 2.1, we have
C(x(0)) ≤ C(x∗) +
2∑
i=1
(ℓi(xi(0)) − ℓi(x∗i )) · x∗i ,
≤ C(x∗) + (ℓ1(x1(0))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · x∗1,
where the second inequality follows from x2(0) < x
∗
2 and ℓ2 increasing. By definition of µ1(L),
(ℓ1(x1(0))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · x∗1
ℓ1(x1(0)) · x1(0) ≤ µ1(L).
The lemma then follows because ℓ1(x1(0)) ≤ C(x(0)) and x1(0) ≤ 12 .
17
Define
µ2(ℓi) = sup
xi≥
1
2
,0≤x∗i≤xi
(ℓi(xi)− ℓi(x∗i )) · (x∗i + 1− 2xi)
ℓi(xi)
for each ℓi ∈ L and
µ2(L) = sup
ℓi∈L
µ(ℓi).
The parameter µ2(L) is a new smoothness parameter that takes into account the pricing
behavior of the firms. Observe that µ2(L) ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 5.3. Let t ∈ T (∞) and xi(t) > 0 for all i = 1, 2. If xi(t) > x∗i and xi(t) ≥ 12 for some
i = 1, 2, then C(x(t)) ≤ 11−µ2(L) · C(x∗).
Proof. W.l.o.g. suppose that x1(t) > x
∗
1 and x1(t) ≥ 12 . By Lemma 2.1 and 3.3, we have
C(x(t))
≤ C(x∗) +
2∑
i=1
(ℓi(xi(t))− ℓi(x∗i )) · x∗i +
2∑
i=1
ti(x
∗
i − xi(t)),
≤ C(x∗) +
2∑
i=1
(ℓi(xi(t))− ℓi(x∗i )) · x∗i
− (ℓ′1(x1(t)) + ℓ′2(x2(t))) · (x1(t)− x∗1) · (2x1(t)− 1),
≤ C(x∗) + (ℓ1(x1(t))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · x∗1 − ℓ′1(x1(t)) · (x1(t)− x∗1) · (2x1(t)− 1),
≤ C(x∗) + (ℓ1(x1(t))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · (x∗1 + 1− 2x1(t)).
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.3, x2(t) ≤ x∗2 and ℓ2 increasing, the third
from ℓ′2(x2(t)) ≥ 0 and the fourth from convexity of ℓ1, ℓ′1(x1(t)) · (x1(t) − x∗1) ≥ ℓ1(x1(t)) −
ℓ1(x
∗
1). Since
(ℓ1(x1(t))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · (x∗1 + 1− 2x1(t))
ℓ1(x1(t))
≤ µ2(Lc),
and, by Lemma 3.3, t1 ≥ t2, we have ℓ1(x1(t)) ≤ C(x(t)) and the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let t ∈ T (∞) and xi(t) > 0 for all i = 1, 2. Suppose that either
x1(t) ≤ x∗1 < x1(0), or x1(0) < x∗1 < x1(t). By the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge [5]), the
profit function of each firm is continuous in c. Given that the profit function of each firm is
continuous in the toll vector (Hayrapetyan et al. [26]), and the toll vector continuously changes
the induced flow (Beckmann et al. [4]), there exists a price cap c such that x1(c) = x
∗
1. So, we
can assume that x∗1 < x1(0) and x
∗
1 < x1(t).
Suppose that x1(t) ≤ 12 . Then by Lemma 5.1, x1(0) ≤ x1(t) ≤ 12 . Since µ1(Ld) ≤
d
(d+1)(d+1)/d
(Correa et al. [15]) and µ1(Lc) ≤ 1, the result follows by Lemma 5.2.
Suppose that x1(t) ≥ 12 . Then
µ2(Ld) = sup
xi(t)≥
1
2
,0≤x∗i≤xi(t)
(ℓ1(x1(t))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · (x∗1 + 1− 2x1(t))
ℓ1(x1(t))
≤ d
2(d+ 1)(d+1)/d
,
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and
µ2(Lc) = sup
xi(t)≥
1
2
,0≤x∗i≤xi(t)
(ℓ1(x1(t))− ℓ1(x∗1)) · (x∗1 + 1− 2x1(t))
ℓ1(x1(t))
≤ sup
1
2
≤x1(t)
1− x1(t) ≤ 1
2
,
and the result follows by Lemma 5.3.
The following example shows that the bound of 8/7 in Theorem 5.1 for affine latencies is
tight for duopolies, and is a lower bound for arbitrary parallel graphs.
Example 5.1. Consider the network of Figure 5 with n ≥ 2.
s t
...
ℓ1(x1) = x1
ℓn−1(xn−1) = xn−1
ℓn(xn) =
1
2(n−1)
Figure 5: The bound for affine latencies is tight.
Let t ∈ T (∞). By Lemma 3.3, t = x(t) = x(0) =
(
1
2(n−1) , . . . ,
1
2(n−1) ,
1
2
)
and x∗ =(
1
4(n−1) , . . . ,
1
4(n−1) ,
3
4
)
.
If 0 ≤ c ≤ 12(n−1) , then we have t1 = . . . = tn = c and thus x(c) =
(
1
2(n−1) , . . . ,
1
2(n−1) ,
1
2
)
.
If c > 12(n−1) , then t1 = . . . = t2 =
1
2(n−1) and thus x(c) =
(
1
2(n−1) , . . . ,
1
2(n−1) ,
1
2
)
. Hence any
price cap is optimal. So
min
c∈R+
C(x(c))
C(x∗)
=
8
7
.
The main result in Theorem 5.1 assumes that a c-capped Nash equilibrium exists for all
c ∈ R+. The following example shows that an uncapped Nash equilibrium need not exist for
quadratic latency functions.
Example 5.2. Consider the network of Figure 6.
s t
ℓ1(x1) = x
2
1
ℓ2(x2) = 0
Figure 6: No Nash equilibrium.
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Then
B∞1 (t2) =
{
t1 =
2t2
3 , if 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 3,
t1 = t2 − 1, if t2 > 3,
and
B∞2 (t1) =


t2 = argmax
t2
(
1− (t2 − t1)1/2
) · t2, if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 14 ,
t2 = t1, if t1 ≥ 14 .
Observe that B∞2 (t1) is not convex at t1 =
1
4 . Combining B
∞
1 (t2) and B
∞
2 (t1) (see Figure 7)
implies that there is no uncapped Nash equilibrium. In fact, the result is even stronger: there
is no c-capped Nash equilibrium whenever c ≥ 12 .
0 1
4
1
2
1
4
1
2
t1
t2
Figure 7: Best reply correspondence: in blue for player 1, and in (dashed) red for player 2.
Remark 5.1. The nonexistence result in Example 5.2 violates the assumption that latency
functions are strictly increasing. Nevertheless, we can change the latency function of link
2 into ℓ2(x2) = a2 · x2 with a2 <
√
17 − 4 and obtain the same result: an uncapped Nash
equilibrium need not exist.
The next and final example shows that the latency costs at the optimal price cap can be
arbitrarily worse than the optimal latency costs due to nonexistence of an uncapped Nash
equilibrium.
Example 5.3. Consider the network of Figure 8, where d ≥ 3.
Then
B∞1 (t2) =

t1 =
d·(t2+( d−1d )
d
)
d+1 , if 0 ≤ t2 ≤ d+ 1−
(
d−1
d
)d
,
t1 = t2 +
(
d−1
d
)d − 1, if t2 > d+ 1− (d−1d )d ,
and
B∞2 (t1) =


t2 = argmax
t2
(
1− (t2 − t1 + b2)1/d
) · t2, if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ d·(d−1)d−1dd ,
t2 = t1 −
(
d−1
d
)d
, if t1 ≥ d·(d−1)
d−1
dd
.
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s t
ℓ1(x1) = x
d
1
ℓ2(x2) =
(
d−1
d
)d
Figure 8: No uncapped Nash equilibrium if d ≥ 3.
Combining B∞1 (t2) and B
∞
2 (t1) implies that there is only an equilibrium for all price caps
c ≤ (d−1d )d−1. If c ≤ (d−1d )d−1, then t1(c) = t2(c) = c. Similarly as in Example 5.2, an
important reason for the nonexistence of equilibria seems to be the nonconvexity of the set of
best replies for player 2 at t1 =
(
d−1
d
)d−1
. Since x(c) = x(0) =
(
d−1
d ,
1
d
)
for all c ≤ (d−1d )d−1,
and x∗ =
(
d−1
d·(d+1)1/d
, 1− d−1
d·(d+1)1/d
)
, we have
ρ(Ld) ≥ min
0≤c≤( d−1d )
d−1
C(x(c))
C(x∗)
=
(d+ 1)(d+1)/d
(d+ 1)(d+1)/d − (d− 1) →∞ as d→∞.
6 Discussion
We consider a network pricing game in which, in the first stage, edge owners set prices so
as to maximize profit, and, in the second stage, users choose paths that minimize their total
costs. The problem with these games is that Nash equilibria might not exist, and if they exist,
they can induce arbitrarily inefficient flows. We therefore allow for competition regulation
and consider a (uniform) price cap regulation policy. Our main goal is, firstly, to find a price
cap that minimizes the inefficiency of the induced flow, and, secondly, to quantify the loss in
efficiency due to competition even in the presence of competition regulation. Our main results
are the following. For parallel link networks with affine latency functions and a full support
Wardrop equilibrium, we provide an algorithm that finds the optimal price cap in polynomial
time. Due to multiplicty of Nash equilibria, the algorithm is not valid for instances without a
full support Wardrop equilibrium. Then we show that the ratio between the congestion costs at
an optimal price cap and the optimal congestion costs are at most 2 for duopoly instances with
an uncapped Nash equilibrium. This bound lowers down to 8/7 for affine latency functions.
However, due to the nonexistence of Nash equilibria, we are able to construct a sequence of
instances such that the performance of the induced flow at an optimal price cap is arbitrarily
bad.
The following questions remain open. First, is there a (polynomial) algorithm that finds
the optimal price cap for more general instances? In particular, for parallel link networks with
affine latency functions that have no full support Wardrop equilibrium. Secondly, we have
provided an instance that shows that the flow at an optimal price cap can be 8/7 times as
costly as the optimal flow. Can the upper bound in Theorem 5.1 be extended from two link
networks to arbitrary parallel link networks with affine latencies? Thirdly, for two link networks
with affine latency functions, a worst-case guarantee of 8/7 also holds for the simple algorithm
that selects the best flow from the Wardrop flow and the uncapped Nash equilibrium flow.
How does this simple algorithm perform for arbitrary parallel link networks? Fourthly, how
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do results change if we assume a different user behavior, like elastic users (Chau and Sim [9],
Hayrapetyan et al. [26] or Ozdaglar [36]), atomic splittable users (Haurie and Marcotte [25],
Orda et al. [35] or Cominetti et al. [13]), or stochastic users (Daganzo and Sheffi [17] or Guo
et al. [23])?
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